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The basic strategy spelled out in the Baker Plan  (1985-88)
remains valid, but stronger policy efforts are needed, banks
should provide multiyear new money packages, exit  bonds
should be  guaranteed to  allow voluntary debt reduction by
banks, and net capital flows to the highly indebted countries
should be raised $15 billion a year. Successful emergence from
the debt crisis, however, will depend primarily on sound eco-
nomic policies in the debtor countries themselves.
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The.  Baker Plan essentially made existing  multilateral development banks raised net flows
strategy cn the debt problem more concrete.  by only one-tenth of the targeted $3 billion
Like existing policy, it iejected a bankruptcy  annually.  If the IMF and bilateral export credit
approach to the problem, judging that coerceo  agencies are included, net capital flows from
forgiveness would "admit defeat" and cut  official sources to the highly indebted countries
borrowers off from capital markets for many  (HICs) actually fell, from $9 annually in 1983-
years to come.  It assumed that the principal  85 to $5 billion annually in 1986-88.
debtor countries could grow their way out of the
debt problem and could expand their exports  Political fatigue is evident in major debtor
enough over time to reduce their debt burden to  countries but their recent stagnant growth has
-ionnal levels.  It called for structural reform  been caused primarily by intemal economic
(particularly trade liberalization, more liberal  distortions (high fiscal deficits and inflation), not
policies on direct foreign investment, and reform  the debt burden. Of the six large Latin American
of the state enterprise sector). And it continued  debtor countries, the three with the largest
the adjustment efforts in the debtor country in  outward transfer of resources relative to GNP
return for financial support from foreign official  (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela) achieved the
and bank creditors.  highest growth and the lo  -t, inflation in 1986-
88, indicating that extemal debt does not explain
The plan did shift emphasis, however: from  high inflation or low growth in Argentina,
short-term balance of payments stabilization to  Brazil, and Mexico.
longer-term development objectives, and thus
from the IMF to the World Bank as lead institu-  The basic intemational debt strategy remains
tion in debt management.  It did not address the  valid, but intensified policy efforts are neces-
problem of the transition from "invo:untary"  sary. Banks should provide multiyear new
lending of new money - in which all banks  money packages.  Banks should also confer
were pressured to lend new amounts proportion-  senior status on "exit bonds,"  and the World
ate to their exposure - back to voluntary capital  Bank should then guarantee these instruments-
flows. And it failed to integrate all public  to make viable substantial voluntary debt
lending, remaining silent on the role of the IMF.  reduction by interested banks. Bilateral and
multilateral creditors should raise annual net
Except for the collapse of oil prices, global  capital flows to the highly indebted countries by
economic conditions were broadly favorable to  $10 billion annually, and the banks by $5
debt management under the Baker Plan.  Major  billion, to cut the outward resource transfer in
Latin American debtors achieved important  half over the next 3 years.  The key to successful
reductions in interest/export ratios. On the other  emergence from the debt crisis, however, will
hand, the banks provided one-third less new  have to be sound economic policies in the debtor
money than the Baker Plan target, and the  countries themselves.
This paper, prepared for the conference "Dealing with the Debt Crisis," is a product
of the Debt and International Finance Division, International Economics Department
Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC
20433.  Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room S8-029, extension 33730 (52
pages with charts and tablecs).
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From the suspension  of  Mexican debt  payments in  August of 1982
through 1983, the debt problem was addressed on a basis of short-
term crisis management.  All four parties were expected to act:
the banks, through rescheduling  payments and providing hiew  loans;
the countries, by adopting adjustment programs;  the international
financial agencies (especially  the IMF), by providing leadership
to  the  banks  and  funding as  well  as  policy  guidance  to  the
countries;  and the industrial  countries, through reschedulings of
export credits in the Paris Clulb  and bridge loans.  The objective
was tw',fold:  to avoid a collapse of the  international banking
system and to permit adjustment and renewed development  in the
debtor countries.
Extremely high interest  rates and severe  global recession had
played  a major  role in precipitating the debt crisis.  Buoyant
recovery by 1984 (with  industrial  country growth at 5  percent) and
a reduction of interest rates (as  LIBOR ebbed from 19 percent at
its 1981 peak to 11 percent) led to considerable optimism in that
year that the debt crisis was on its way to resolution.  Indeed,
key  debtors  ran  large current account surpluses,  and  economic
growth in Latin America again turned  positive (3.7  percent, versus
-1.2 percent in 1982 and -2.6 percent in 1983).
By 1985 the mood began to swing once again toward pessimism.2
Latin American policy-makers were  facing intensifying political
pressure  as  the  lagged  effect  of  severe  recession  in  1983.
Moreover, they were beginning to conclude that bank lending could
be expected to remain  frozen  over the near  term, despite adjustment
progress.  Governments had shifted from military to civilian rule
in Argentina and Brazil, and in both countries there were initial
breaks with the formula of IMF-led adjustment that had dominated
the initial response to the debt crisis.
In US policy circles, economic leadership had sb-fted in an
activist direction under new Treasury Secretary James Baker, as
illustrated  by his Plaza Agreement in September 1985  to reduce the
value  of  the  overly-strong  dollar  to  avoid  a  protectionist
outbreak.  In debt, Mexico in particular provided reason for this
Texan's concern,  as  that count.y  experienced  fiscal  erosion,  rising
inflation,  weakening oil prices, and a devastating  earthquake.  It
was evident that Mexico would once again need to borrow from the
banks as its large 1984 current account surplus evaporated with a
partial recovery in imports  and lower oil exports.  Yet the banking
community was in no mood to renew lending.
Desian
Although Mexico was an  important catalyst, the  Baker team
prepared a broader attack on the debt problem that amounted to a
global indicative plan.
STRATEGY AND TARGETS  --  The new initiative called for banks to
extend new lending amounting to approximately $7 billion annually
($20 billion  over  three  years), or  2-1/2  percent  of  existing3
exposure each year, to  15 major developing countries with debt
difficulties.  The implication  was that this target was conceived
of as a net disbursements concept, above and beyond amortization
of principal (but  not net of interest  payments).  The announcement
of this goal for bank lending served notice that the absence of
major  new  money  programs  in  1984-85, which  had  been  possible
because of the greater than expected increases in trade surpluses
of debtor countries, could not be expected to continue over the
medium term.
The plan called for structural  reform  by the  debtor countries.
It stressed three areas: trade liberalization, the liberalization
of policies toward direct foreign investment, and reform of the
state enterprise sector, including through privatization.
Industrial countries were to provide more support through an
increase in net loan disbursements  of multilateral  banks (MDBs)  by
$3  billion  annually ($9  billion over three  years).  Secretary Baker
indicated  that successful  implementation  of  the plan by all parties
would  serve as the condition for US  support for a  substantial
increase  in  the  capital  of the  World  Bank,  a  measure  which,
however, US authorities were not yet prepared to endorse at the
time.  Added to the 1985 base of net disbursements by MDBs, the
expansion meant total net capital flows  (excluding interest) of
approximately $7 billion annually from these agencies, or almost
the  same three-year magnitude as the $20 billion asked of the
banks.  Private bank/ public sector symmetry thus seemed present.
The  Baker  Plan  essentially  provided  a  more  concrete4
formulation  of the existing strategy on the debt problem.  It did
not  change  the  fundamental assumptions  of  that  strategy.  In
V  -
particular,  from  the  outset  the  debt  strategy had  rejected  a
bankruptcy approach in which major portions of existing debt would
be forqiven on a coerced basis.  The plan's architects judged that
forced forgiveness  would "admit  defeat" and cut off borrowers from
capital markets for many years to come.
Instead,  the  plan  continued  the  policy  premise  that  the
principal debtor countries could grow their way out of the debt
problem, and in a  non-hostile world economy could expand their
exports enough over time to reduce their relative debt burdens to
sustainable levels compatible with a return to more normal credit
market access.  The new initiative  also continued the principle of
financial support by foreign official and bank creditors, .tched
by adjustment effort in the debtor countries.
STRENGTHS --  The plan did make an important shift in emphasis.
It  stressed  that the official  community  recognized  the debt problem
was one that would take a long time to address, and that it was
foremost a problem of economic development.  This thrust of the
pln  was widely interpreted  to signify  a move away from.  short-term
balance of payments stabilization, particularly through programs
that could have contractionary  effects,  to longer-term  development
objectives.  The implicit institutional  shift was from the IMF to
the  World Bank as the lead institution  in  debt management.  In  view
of the costly recessions of 1982-83,  this new emphasis was timely.
The  plan  was  also  correctly  oriented  in  its  intent  of5
encouraging  new bank lending.  From the outset of the debt problem
it  had  been  apparent  that  the  free  rider  problem,  in  which
individual  banks could seek to avoid new lending  yet would benefit
from  the strengthening  of the country's  ability  to ride through  the
crisis resulting from new loans by other banks, could cause bank
lending to grind to a halt, and that orientation from a central
force was necessary to deal with this externality.  The IMF had
provided  this  direction early  in the  crisis;  the  Baker  Plan
targets sought to do so over the medium term.
The initiative  was also positive in its implicit confirmation
that the industrial  country  governments  recognized  a responsibility
to participate in the solution to the debt problem.  Public sector
action was to occur primarily through the MDBs.  This commitment
was important in  an environment  of the facile  and  popular political
critique that the public sector should not bail out the banks.
The plan was even broadly correct in its selection of the
priority  structural  reforms  in  debtor  countries.  Excessive
protection and import-substituting  industrialization  carried to an
inefficient extreme had played a large role in the vulnerability
of Latin America to the debt problem, as this development strategy
had left an export  base much weaker  than that developed in  the East
Asian NICs.  Similarly, the fiscal fragility that had given rise
to much of foreign  borrowing owed much to chronic  deficits of state
enterprises.  The emphasis on direct investment was also logical
given the need to reverse the pendulum in its extreme swing in the
1570s from risk capital inflows to borrowing abroad.6
WEAKNESSES --  The Baker initiative did not address the difficult
problem  of  the  transition  from  "concerted"  (or "involuntary")
lending through "new money packages,"  in which  all banks  were
pressured  to  lend  additional  amounts  in  proportion  to  their
exposure at  the  outset  of  the debt  crisis, back  to voluntary
capital flows. Indeed, the more pressure applied in  pursuit of the
bank lending targets, the more resentment there was likely to be
and the longer the delay of voluntary lending. At the same time,
the official sector lacked  means other than moral suasion  to ensure
that the private sector  met the lending targets in the indicative
planr.
The  initiative appears to have been somewhat misleading in
its capital flow targets for the public sector by not taking an
integrated approach to all *ifficial  lending, and in particular by
remaining silent on the role of the IMF.  As discussed below, the
shift of the IMF from an extremely active new lending role early
in the debt crisis to a posture of minimal or negative new lending
meant that the widely publicized targets for expansion of lending
by  multilateral  development  banks  overstated  the  net  capital
contribution  that  could  be  expected  from  the  international
institutions as a whole. From the bureaucratic standpoint it was
natural to argue that the IMF was not a "development agency" and
thus could not be expected to continue indefinitely its initial
high level of net lending; but from the standpoint of the broader
development objectives of the Baker plan itself, a comprehensive
view of public sector financing for the debt problem needed to be7
taken.  The  same observation applied to bilateral export credit
agencies,  which had provided  considerable  financing  before  the debt
crisis but cut back much like the private banks after its onset.
There was an awkwardness in the seeming interventionism of
the industrial country governments into what could be considered
the internal affairs of the debtor countries.  While liberalized
treatment of imports and foreign investment and slimming of the
state sector were  in practice desirable  in many  o- the debtor
countries,  in principle  adjustment and  growth  could  have  been
carried out through other means of fiscal correction and improved
efficiency  at the choice  of each country  according  to its  political
tradition.  There were de'lays  in the mobilization of new lending
efforts in early 1986 as each major debtor waited for another to
bear any taint that might be associated with being the first to
sign  up in  the program, thus appearing  to accept foreign  conditions
in  areas  more  fundamental  than  the  macroeconomic  guidelines
familiar in IMF programs.
There was also considerable doubt about the adequacy of the
capital flow targets of the Baker Plan.  From 1981 to 1985 the net
transfer  of resources (capital  inflow  less  net  payments of interest
and profits abroad) to the highly indebted  countries identified in
the  Baker  Plan  fell  from  $18.3 billion  to  -$26.5  billion,l a
decline of almost $45 billion.  The 1981 flows had been seriously
I  World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing
Countries. 1988-89  Edition,  Vol. I (Washington:  World Bank, 1988),
p. xvii.  Hereafter referred to as World Bank Tables 1988.8
exaggerated  by excess  demand in some key countries such as Mexico,
and  the  1985  flows  had  been  artificially  small  because  of
transitory high current  account balances in  major debtor countries
such as Mexico and Brazil that meant they were not asking for new
money.  Nonetheless, reversal of only one-fourth of the decline in
resources transfers (through  an increase of $10 billion annually
between the banks and the multilateral development banks, "nBs)
appeared to be too modest a policy goal, and many analysts  gued
that the objective should be at least twice as large.  There was,
of course, an in"  trent  tension  between  the scale of  new lending  and
the  speed of reductioi:  of the  debt burden  to more  sustainable
levels,  which many critics  of the Baker Plan who attacked both the
lending target as too low and the debt buildup as too high failed
to recognize.
Mid-term Evolution
Brazil's moratorium in early 1987 triggered widespread loan-
loss provisions by US banks, and both events led to an erosion in
market psychology that drove secondary market prices for the debt
of major Latin American countries from the range of 60-80 cents on
the dollar to the 40-60 cent level.  An increasing  number of banks,
especially regional  banks that had been involved in Latin American
lending for a relatively brief  Ieriod in the late 1970s, simply
wanted to be rid of their portfolios of loans to debtor countries.
Lengthy delay in  mobilization  of the $7.7  billion new  money package
for Mexico  in late 1986 had led many to question whether there
could be any further new lending programs.9
At the annual-meetings  of the IMF and World Bank in September
of  1987,  Secretary baker suggested a  further evolution of his
initiative,  which  .alled  for a  "menu approach" to tailor the forms
of bank participation in  support  of  debtor countries  to the varying
interests of the individual banks.  The approach included more
attractive  vehicles  for  new  money  (bonds  to  confer  implicit
seniority, rights to convert new loans into equity) as well as
alternative options for banks desiring to exit from the new-money
process ("exit  bonds").2  Secretary Baker backed the new approach
more concretely  when the  US Treasury  subsequently  gave its  blessing
to Mexico's exit bond, designed with Morgan Guaranty, which used
Mexican  reserves to  purchase zero-coupon US  Treasury bonds  as
collateral for 20 year bonds paying LIBOR plus 1-5/8  percent.  The
Mexicans hoped banks would convert  existing claims  at cloise  to the
secondary market  price of 50  cents on the dollar in return for  this
more  secure  instrument,  and  some  did;  but  the  total  volume
exchanged was limited ($3  billion) and so was the discount (which
turned out to be 30 percent rather than 50 percent), because the
bonds  had  a  guarantee  only  for distant maturity and  none  for
ongoing interest payments.  In addition, the banks credited the
menu approach with the relative success in  mobilizing a package of
$5.2 billion  in new lending for Brazil  in 1988, although when
2  Several of these options as well as alternatives such as
discounted  debt  buybacks were  examined  in  my  Mobilizing  Bank
Lending  to  Debtor  Countries  (Washington:  Institute  for
International  Economics,  Policy  Analyses in  International  Economics
No. 18, June 1987)..LO
Brazil launched its new anti-inflation program in January of 1989
it.s  negotiators informed the banks that some of the attractive
features ("relending"  and debt-equity  conversion)  would have to be
suspended or scaled back temporarily.
Results of the Strategy
By the end of the three-year time horizon of the original
Baker Plan, its results as the core international strategy for
dealing with the debt problem were mixed, but considerably more
positive than the widespread image of failure conveyed by some of
the media,  some entities representing developing countries, and
some academic,  legislative,  and  business figures (including  Senator
Bill  Bradley  and  the  President  of  American  Express,  James
Robinson).  An evaluation of the results of the strategy requires
special care in attributing a causal role to external debt, and
within debt, a causal  role to the Baker Plan.  With this cautionary
note in mind, the results of the Baker initiative may be reviewed
according to several criteria.
ECONOMIC  GROWTH  --  The bottom line of  the Baker Plan was supposed
to be a restoration of economic growth in the debtor countries.
Ironically,  their  growth  rates  were  higher  in  the  two  years
immediately  before the plan than during its  duration.  Thus, Latin
America as a whole achieved growth of 3.7 percent in 1984 and 3.6
percent in 1985.  While the rate was approximately the same at 3.9
percent in 1986, the region's real GNP growth decelerated to 2.511
percent  in  1987  and  only  0.7 percent in  1988.3  However, the
argument is  developed  below that the  primary source  of  this decline
was not the external debt problem, but the adverse growth effects
of high domestic inflation.  As discussed below, those countries
that did achieve favorable  performance  on domestic adjustment were
able to obtain relatively high growth in the Baker Plan period
(1986-88).
INTERNATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  --  An assumption of the Baker Plan wIs
that the  international economy would  not  collapse and make  it
impossible for the debtor countries to increase their exports and
"grow their way out" of  the debt problem.  The industrial  countries
more than fulfilled this prerequisite.  Thus, average growth in
industrial countries in 1986-88 stood at 3.3 percent, comfortably
above the range of 3 percent (or, after LIBOR subsided to single
digits, 2-1/2 percent or lower)  that had been considered necessary
for progress on debt.'
International  interest  rates  also  remained  in  a  range
compatible with emergence from the debt problem.  For 1986-88 as
a whole, LIBOR averaged 7.3 percent, less than half the level of
1981-82.  Although the  rate rose by  200 basis points  from the
fourth  quarter of 1987  to the fourth  quarter of 1988 (when  it stood
3  Economic Commission for Latin America, Balance Preliminar
de  la Economia Latinoamericana: 1988  (Santiago: ECLA,  December
1988).  Hereafter referred to as ECLA 1988.
4  IMF, World Economic Outlook. October 1988, p. 59;  William
R.  Cline, "International  Debt:  Analysis, Experience  and  Prospects,"
Journal of Development Planning, No. 16, 1985, pp. 25-56.12
at 8.9 percent),  in part because of attempts to  stabilize the
dollar, US inflation  was also up (from -3 percent in 1986 and +2.6
percent in 1987 to 4.1 percent in 1988, wholesale price index) so
that real international  interest  rates  were not much changed  at the
end of 1988 (and  were lower than in 1986).
International prices of commodities and especially oil were
the principal area in which the world economic environment caused
serious difficulty during the Baker plan  period.  As  figure  1
shows, the dollar price of oil fell by half in 1986, and after a
modest recovery in 1987, in 1988  was not  much higher than the weak
level of 1986.  Several debtors among the 15 countries identified
in the  indicative Baker Plan depend heavily on oil, especially
Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Ecuador.  Because oil is a smaller
share of imports for such oil-importing debtors as Brazil than it
is of exports for the oil-exporting countries, it is fair to say
that the collapse of oil prices during the Baker Plan period was
the  most  severe  blow  to  the  strategy  from  the  international
economy.
Other commodity prices were weak but less dramatically so.
Figure  1  shows  an  index  of  nominal  dollar  prices  for  six
commodities weighted by their shares in Latin America's exports. 5
The prices of these raw materials  had shown promising recovery from
5  Coffee  (32.6 percent),  soybeans  (25.8 percent), copper
(22.8 percent), corn (9.1  percent), sugar (5.9  percent), and beef
(3.  9  percent).  Price  series  are  from International Financial
Statistics;  trade shares  calculated  from  Inter-American  Development
Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1987 Regort
(Washington:  IDB, 1987), pp. 474-5.13
the initial debt crisis year of 1982 to 1984, as they rose by 9.1
percent.  But from 1984 to 1987  these commodity  prices fell  by 15.8
percent, dominated by  excess supply  in world  grains  trade and
coffee.  Dollar  commodity  prices  had  been  expected  by  many
economists to rise once the dollar fell, and signs of this process
began with higher copper  prices by 1987.  By 1988 there was a much
broader commodity price  increase, as the index for the six raw
materials rose by 30 percent from 1987 and stood 10 percent above
the 1984 level.  US drought spurred  grains  prices, and a world boom
in production and trade added more generalized upward pressures.
DEBT  INDICATORS  --  Ir.  a  world  economic environment that  was
generally  hospitable,  with  the  most  notable  exception  of  oil
prices, by 1988 the debt indicators for  the major debtor countries
were showing significant improvement.  Figure 2 shows the most
important  single  indicator  of  the  debt  burden,  the  ratio  of
interest  payments  to  exports  of  goods  and  services,  for  the  six
largest  Latin  American  debtor  countries,  which  account  for
69 percent of external debt of the Baker-15 countries.  By 1988
the interest/exports  ratio was lower than its highest past year in
all  six  countries.  From  their  peak  levels  for  the  1980s,  the
interest/export  ratios had  declined  from  57.1 percent  to  29.7
percent in Brazil, 47.3 percent to 29.1 percent in Mexico (despite
the  collapse  of oil  prices),  58.4 percent  to  40.4 percent  in
Argentina, 31.1 percent  to 26.4  percent in  Venezuela, 49.5 percent
to 22.6 percent in Chile, and  26.7 percent to 20.8 percent in14
Colombia.  By 1988 the interest/export ratio was not only lower
than in the debt crisis year of 1982 but also either lower than or
equal to the ratio  in the pre-crisis year of 1981  for Brazil,
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia.  For Latin America as a whole, the
ratio stood at the same lavel in 1988 (28  percent) as in 1981, and
well below the peak 1982 level of 41 percent. 6
Even the absolute level of debt, and the ratio of debt to
exports and goods and services (which  fails to take account of the
sharp decrease  in the price of debt, the interest rate) showed
moderating trends by 1988.  As indicated in figure 3, in 1988 the
dollar value of total external debt for Latin America as a whole
fell  (from $410 billion to $401 billion) as the consequence of
debt-equity conversions and substantial discounted debt buybacks
in the private sector.  In real terms (deflating  by US wholesale
prices),  by 1988  debt for  the six countries stood  only 13.5 percent
above  the  1982  level,  for average  annual  growth  of  only  2.1
percent.  And the ratio of debt to exports of goods and services
declined from its 1986 peak for the six countries at 424 percent
to only 339 percent, a level moderately lower than in 1982 (354
percent) and not far removed from the pre-crisis 1981 level (331
percent).
In view of these absolute and relative trends, the summary
view presented in  the  World Bank's  1988  debt report  was misleading:
.. most of the indebted countries are still no better
off than in 1982 --  when the debt crisis erupted.  Debt
disbursed and outstanding has doubled, and debt service
6  ECLA 1988, table 17.15
payments on a  cash basis are ore-third higher. 7
By aggregating debt for all developing countries, the statement
seriously obscured the progress in the major Latin American debtor
countries that had been and remain the central core of the debt
crisis as a systemic  problem.  Thus, it  may be seen in table 1  that
the increase in debt in the 17 Highly Indebted Countries (HICs),
or the  iriginal Baker 15 plus  Costa Rica  and Jamaica, was  far
smaller than in other developing countries  (34.8 percent versus
63.2 percent).  Moreover, of the large volume debt increases in
other developing countries, the bulk occurred in countries well
capable of carrying  debt; indeed,  had they not been, the debt would
not have increased  as it  did.  The largest  absolute and percentage
increase in  debt occurred in  China.  Other large absolute increases
occurred in Greece,  Hungary, India, Indonesia,  Malaysia, Thailand,
and Turkey, all countries that have remained outside the locus of
the debt crisis (and  indeed,  Turkey overcame its earlier crisis to
achieve new access to credit).8
In short, for the major Latin American debtors at the center
of the debt crisis, there has been much more improvement in the
key debt indicators than is  generally recognized.  Large increases
in debt of such countries as China, India, Greece and Portugal
7  World Bank Tables 1988, Vol. I, p. xi.
B  The World Bank data, which only extend through 1987, do
not capture the reduction in Latin American debt that occurred in
1988, as discussed above.  Note also that the World Bank data show
larger  1987  debt  than  does  the  Economic  Commission  for  Latin
America (table  1).16
should be  construed as a  continued functioning of the  capital
market for  developing countries  despite  the Latin  American  problem,
rather than  as evidence that the world  debt problem has grown
worse.
CAPITAL FLOWS  --  A widespread view is that the private banks fell
far short of their lending targets under the Baker Plan.  In fact,
the banks did lend less than the plan called for,  but the shortfall
was limited to about one-third.  A much less recognized pattern is
that on a consolidated  basis, capital flows from the public sector
to the Baker countries actually fell by approximately $4 billion
annually, rather than rising by $3 billion annually as implied by
the Plan.  The main reason for  the public sector  shortfall  was that
decreases  in  IMF  and  bilateral  (mainly export  credit  agency)
lending were not offset by increases in lending by multilateral
development  banks.
Table 2 reports  capital  flows (net  disbursements)  to the Baker
countries during the Plan years, 1986-88.  For the private banks,
the figures  refer to the actual  disbursements  under the agreed "new
money  packages."  Because  outstanding principal  was  typically
rolled  over in  this period,  net disbursements  are approximately  the
same  as  gross  disbursements. 9 For  the  IMF,  net  flows  are
9  The major  exception is for Venezuela, where  there were
repayments of principal of about $1 billion annually.  However,
the Venezuelan government chose to repay principal  rather than
enter an IMF adjustment program, the condition the banks insisted
on  for  complete  rescheduling  and  new  money.  In  any  event,
overstatement of the effort made by the banks from the standpoint
of not deducting Venezuelan repayments is approximately offset by
understatement from the standpoint of commitments undertaken by
the banks but not disbursed because of changes in circumstances.17
calculated by multiplying  the change  in the number  of SDRs  in
outstanding "use of Fund credit" at the end of each year by the
average dollar/SDR exchange rate for the year.
The  table  shows that  the banks  achieved capital  flows of
approximately $14  billion  over the Baker Plan  period, or about two-
thirds  of the target $20  billion for  these countries.  It is clear,
however, that the flows were concentrated in the major countries.
The smaller countries typically were unable to mobilize new money
packages.  This pattern reflected the greater importance of the
large debtors to the banks, and implicitly the greater bargaining
power that these countries had in new money negotiations.
Table 2  also shows that the multilateral development banks
achieved average net disbursements of $4.2  billion annually during
the  Baker  Plan  period.  This  outcome  represented  a  massive
shortfall from the target set under the Plan, according to which
annual net disburements were to rise by $3 billion.  Considering
that the annual average for 1983-85  stood at $3.86 billion (table
3), the  actual  increase achieved  amounted to  only  about  $300
million annually, one-tenth of the target. 10
The outcome  was worse in IMF lending.  For  the 1986-88  period,
Thus, the banks pledged up to $7.7 billion to Mexico in the 1986-
87 new money package, but because oil prices recovered the full
amount was not activated.
10  The World Bank made net disbursements to Latin America
amounting to $1.8 billion in its fiscal 1988.  This rate was below
the institution's  average  of $2.4 billion  annually in FY84-88.  For
its  part, the Interamerican  Development  Bank faced  paralysis in net
lending as the result  of an impasse  with the United States over US
veto power.18
the IMF was a net taker of funds from the Baker countries, for a
total of $2.7  billion.  The largest  net repayments  were from Brazil
and  Yugoslavia,  but  of  the  17  countries  in  questidh,  11  had
negative capital flows from the IMF over the period.
Table 3 suminarizes  the capital flows under the Baker Plan and
before.  The  disbursements  from  banks  averaged  $4.6  billion
annually in 1986-88,  modestly lower than in 1985  but less  than half
the rate of the early debt crisis years of 1983-84 ($12 billion
annually) and even further  below the  more than $20  billion annually
in 1981-82. Nonetheless,  as noted  the banks met approximately  two-
thirds of their new lending target under the Baker Plan.
For the public sector, capital flows to the Baker countries
averaged $5.2 billion annually in 1986-88,  sharply lower than the
average of $9.3 billion during 1983-85.  The main reason for the
decline was the reduction in IMF flows (from $6.5 billion in 1983
to -$1.1 billion in 1988, a swing of $7.6 billion).  Flows fro-
the bilateral credit agencies averaged $1.9 billion annually in
1986-88, and thus showed a significant  recovery from the lowpoint
of less than $700 million in 1987 (although the 1986-88 average
still remained below the $2.5 billion annual rate in 1981-83).
Overall, the failure of multilateral bank lending to rise by the
target amount, and the only limited  recovery  of bilateral lending,
meant  that  the  large  decline  in  net  IMF  lending  placed  the
consolidated official sector  lending  in the  Baker  Plan period
sharply below the average levels of the preceding three years.
There were of course good reasons for part of this decline.19
Countries such as Brazil that chose not to entex an IMF program
ficed large repayments of earlier IMF credits.  And in the very
design of the Baker Plan, the IMF was regarded as a  "revolving
credit" agency rather than an aid institution, and international
officials did not necessarily regard the reflows to the  ,MF as
inappropriate. The broader  problem,  however, was that the original
design of the Baker Plan failed to treat the official sector on a
consolidated basis.  The  increase of  lending targeted  for the
multilateral  banks  should  have  taken  account  of  any  expected
reflows  to  the  IMF  and  any  decline  anticipated  in  bilateral
lending.  Expression of the official sector contribution to the
Baker Plan as limited to multilateral development banks  sent a
misleading  signal.  Unfortunately,  not  even  that  target  was
achieved.
The central implication  of the record on capital flows to the
Baker countries in 1986-88 is that both the private and public
sectors fell  short of their goals.  The public sector  shortfall  was
considerably greater than that of the banks, especially if the IMF
and bilateral institutions  are included. This record  suggests  that
calls for increased  official  sector financing  to deal with the debt
problem are not inappropriate.
STRUCTURAL REFORM  --  There has been a  significant amount of
structural reform under the Baker Plan, although presumably less
than its authors envisioned.  The most far-reaching reforms have
come in Mexico, probably because that country faced one of the
largest  fiscal  and  external shocks  (from the  collapse  in oil20
prices) and has a political regime with relatively high  control
from the top.  In 1986 Mexico broke with long tradition and became
a member of the GATT.  By the end of 1988, it had cut its maximum
tariffs to  20 percent  (and average tariffs to  10 percent) and
reduced  the  share  of  imported  products  under  quantitative
restrictions  from  virtually 100  percent in 1982  to only 23  percent.
In the state enterprise sector,  the Mexican government reduced the
number of state firms from nearly 1,200 in 1982 to fewer than 500
by 1988.  Although many of the privatizations or closures involved
small entitities, by late 1988 the government had privatized such
large enterprises as the airline  Aerovias de Mexico and the copper
firm Mexicana  de Cobre.  There was also progress toward  trade
liberalization and privatization in Argentina (where  by late 1988
the government planned to sell 40 percent of the state telephone
company to a Spanish telephone entity  and 40 percent of Aerolineas
Argentinas to Skandinavian  Airline  Systems). Even in Brazil,  where
import protection had remained relatively unchanged and there was
a  tradition  of  strong  state  enterprises,  in  late  1988  the
government  announced the  freeing of half  of some  2,500  import
categories  under  import  prohibition,  and  in  early  1989  the
government's new anti-inflation  plan included  a pledge to cut back
government employment by tens of thousands. 11
II  William  R. Cline and Riordan  Roett, Latin  American Economic
Outlook, No. 88-3, December 31, 1988.  Note that the close timing
of Mexico's acceleration of privatizations in late 1988 and the
October announcement by US authorities of a  $3.5 billion credit
line to Mexico  suggested that  linkage of  financial support to
structural  reform  under  the  Baker  Plan  had  concrete  content.
Similarly, there have been large World Bank loans to Argentina and21
BANK VULNERABILITY  --  From the onset of t e  debt crisis in 1982,
a major policy goal was to avoid a  severe  disturbance to the world
economy from a crisis in international  banking.  By the time of the
advent of the Baker Plan, the locus of the debt problem had already
shifted away from bank vulnerability toward the need to restore
sustainable growth in debtor countries.  By the end of 1988, the
international  banking system  had become  even less  vulnerable to  the
debt  problem.  European  banks  had  generally  set  aside  large
provisions on Latin  American  debt.  US banks had continued  to bus  <
capital and, after Brazil declared its moratorium in early 1987,
had set aside sizeable loan loss reserves.  By late 1988, US banks
had reduced the ratio of their exposure to the 15 Baker countries
to primary capital from 136  percent in 1982  to 58  percent.  For the
nine money-center banks,  the ratio of total developing country
loans to  primary capital fell  from 191 percent  in 1982 to  85
percent in 1987.  Bank regulators testifying before Congress in
early  1988  indicated  that  third  world  debt  was  no  longer  a
proximate threat to the banking system.12
POLITICAL  FATIGUE  --  By the  end  of  'ts  initial three-year
horizon,  the  Baker  plan  had  failed  to  dispell  the  political
perception  in  key  debtor  countries that  the  debt  problem  was
Mexico for trade sector reform.
12  Thus, the Comptroller of the Currency testified that "the
vulnerability of the US banking system  to LDC debt performance  has
lessened significantly,"  while the Chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation stated that "at this time we cannot foresee
any bank failures resulting from LDC exposure alone."  Washington
Post, January 6, 1989; New York Times, January 6, 1989.22
condemning their economies to stagnation.  Elections were to be
held in 1989 in both Argentina and Brazil.  The front-runner in
Argentina, Peronist Carlos Menem, spoke of a five-year moratorium
on debt payments (sometimes  using the qualification "negotiated").
Two  leading presidential candidates in Brazil, leftists Leonel
Brizcla  and Luis Inacio da Silva (the  labor leader "Lula"),  called
for  a  moratorium  on debt  payments.  Even  in Mexico,  the  new
president  Carlos  Salinas  de  Gortari  had  faced  unprecedented
domestic opposition in considerable part over the debt question,
and his statements on taking office emphasized the need for debt
reduction (but  not through moratorium or confrontation).  And the
new president of Venezuela, Carlos Andres  Perez, had similarly
seemed to take a tough line on debt (and  the country found itself
compelled to suspend a large portion of principal payments at the
end of 1988 as its non-gold reserves fell precariously low).
Political  debt fatigue  is  easy to  understand.  In  Mexico, real
wages  in  1987 stood almost  30 percent below their  1980 level.
Inflation reached unprecedented dimensions in Latin America  in
1987-88.  Per capita  income for the  region  in 1988 fstood  6.6
percent below its 1981 level. 13 The understandable but simplistic
reaction  was to  blame external  debt for all of these economic ills.
An equally  simplistic and  dangerous tendency  was to infer that some
form of radical debt relief would mean renewed high growth and
price stability.
13  ECLA 1988, table 3.23
Yet the region itself  had already generated  two major lessons
indicating that at least confrontational attempts to reduce the
debt burden were counterproductive.  In Peru, a unilateral ceiling
on debt payments had been followed by a short-lived boom and then
recession and extremely  high inflation,  and by 1988  the country  was
compelled to adopt harsh austerity measures and seek renewed ties
with the IMF.  In Brazil, a moratorium on debt during  1987 was
subsequently characterized as a mistake by the President and the
Finance Minister,  and the loss of credit  lines alone cost the
country  at least  Sl-l/2  billion.
The Debt/Inflation/Growt_i  Nexus
The proper reading of the experience of major Latin American
debtors in the past six years is not that debt condemns them to
stagnation and inflation,  but instead  that the countries  which have
adopted appropriate economic policies have shown the capacity to
achieve economic growth, relative price stability, and reductions
in relative debt burdens.  The principal cause of stagnation in
1987  and  1988  was  from  domestic  policy  distortions  and  high
inflation in particular, not the debt problem.  Nor was inflation
caused primarily by the debt burden.
RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND GROWTH  --  The analytical framework that
might  suggest  the  opposite  is  of  course  the  relationship of
resource  transfers  to  growth.  Under  a  traditional,  simple
development  model  (Harrod-Domar), growth  is  determined by  the
resources available  for investment. These resources  equal  domestic
saving plus saving from abroad.  As capital inflows fell far  below24
interest payments on external debt after the debt crisis, foreign
saving  shifted  from positive to  negative,  and the  traditional
saving/investment  model  suggested  lower  growth  would  result.
Similarly, in the "two-gap" model in which there can be a special
role for foreign exchange available for critical imported inputs
and  capital  goods,  the  reduction  in  net  foreign  exchange
availability can slow growth.
The  "resource  transfer"  argument  becomes  less  relevant,
however, when production is below full capacity, as has been true
in many instances in recent years in debtor countries.  Output can
be expanded for a time without large new investment.  Similarly,
where  domestic savings rates are abnormally low, correction of
domestic  policies  to  boost  saving  can  substitute  for  foreign
saving.  At the same time, export expansion  can serve as an engine
of  growth for the economy, so that ironically  high exports and thus
high outward transfer of resources may be associated with  high
growth.  The extraordinary trade surpluses of Taiwan and Korea,
coexistent with their high growth rates, are vivid examples.
The  six  major  Latin  American  debtor  countries  provide  a
laboratory for testing the hypothesis that the outward  transfer of
resources  imposed by  the debt crisis has caused  a  collapse in
growth.  Figure  4 plots average  real GNP growth in the Baker period
1986-88  against  average  outward  transfer  of  resources  as  a25
percentage of GNP for these countries.14  If  the resource  constraint
were binding, one would expect  the countries  with the highest ratio
of outward transfer of resources to GNP to have the lowest growth
rates.  As indicated in figure 1, just the opposite appears to be
the case.  During 1986-88, Colombia,  Venezuela, and Chile had the
highest ratios of outward resource transfer to GNP among the six
large Latin American  debtor  countries (an  unweighted average  of 4.6
percent of GNP), yet they had relatively favorable growth rates
(averaging  5.2  percent annually).  In contrast,  Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico had lower outward  resource transfers (an  average of 2.4
percent of  GNP)  but  nonetheless had  lower growth  as well  (an
average of 1.9 percent annually).  While few would conclude that
larger outward resource  transfers generate faster  growth (although
the notion of export-led growth  tends in  that direction), the data
do contradict the view that it is outward transfers of resources
that are causing economic stagnation in Latin America.
RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND INFLATION  --  The obvious explanation for
low recent growth in countries such as Brazil and Argentina is  the
adverse impact  of their inability  to control inflation. Truly high
inflation, in the range of several hundred percent annually, is
inimical to growth.  It makes investment decisions difficult by
making economic projections highly unstable.  Figure 5 provides
support  to  the  idea  that  high  inflation  is a  major  cause  of
14  The resource transfer estimates  refer to the excess of net
payments of interest and profits over net inflows of capital.  The
data are from ECLA 1988.26
stagnation.  The figure shows that among the six largest Latin
American debtor  countries,  those with the lowest  inflation in 1985-
81 had the highest growth in 1986-88.  Thus, in Chile, Colombia,
and Venezuela, where inflation averaged 23.5 percent annually in
1985-87, economic  growth averaged 5.2 percent annually in 1986-88..
In contrast, in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, inflation averaged
177 percent annually in 1985-87  while growth was only 1.9 percent
on average.  Few would  dispute the  rol2  of high  inflation in
causing slow recent growth in major Latin American countries.
There  is,  nonetheless, both  a  popular  perception  and  an
analytical  argument that high inflation  has been caused  by the debt
problem, so that in the end economic stagnation in the area is
indeed attributable to the debt problem.  The popular perception
goes little further than the notion that debt has been the major
cause of all economic disturbances.  The analytical argument is
two-fold.  .irst,  attempts  to adjust  externally  have required  sharp
devaluation of the exchange rate, and devaluation  boosts cost-push
inflation.  Second, the debt crisis suddenly thrust governments
into a fiscal crisis because they could not mobilize the internal
transfer of resources from  the private sector  to the public sector
needed to replace the former inward  transfer from foreign creditor
to the domestic public sector.  The internal transfer problem thus
necessitated a higher inflation  tax, the argument goes.
The best case for debt-imposed inflation  can probably be made
for Mexico.  There  the government adopted  sharp exchange rate
devaluation in 1986 when oil prices collapsed, and the devaluation27
played an important role in  the acceleration of inflation from  the
range of 65 percent to, by 1987, 160 percent.  In Argentina and
Biazil, however,  inflation in the high  triple  digits  has  been
essentially  the  consequence  of a  combination  of  high  domestic
fiscal deficits  (on the order of 4 to 8 percent of GNP in real
terms and over 30 percent in Brazil in nominal terms), on the one
hand, and  indexation mechanisms that perpetuate each successive
plateau of inflation, on the other.  Thus, the real exchange rate
was almost constant in  Brazil from 1983 through 1987, and actually
appreciated by some 10  percent in 1988.  Similarly, although there
was a  large real devaluation of the Argentine currency it,  1982
after major overvaluation at the beginning of the 1980s, the real
exchange  rate  in 1986-88 was  not much  different  from the  1982
level.
The  internal transfer argument is more  ambiguous, but the
essential issue is whether it would be appropriate for countries
to  sustain  large  fiscal deficits  over  several  years,  whether
financed  from  abroad  or  domestically.  Virtually  all  of  the
governments of major Latin American countries have by now come to
the conclusion  that high fiscal deficits are  incompatible with
growth and acceptable inflation, and it would seem to stretch a
point to imply that if the debt crisis had not arisen, countries
could  have  continued  high  fiscal  deficits  with  high  foreign
financing over long periods of time.
Once again, the evidence for the Baker Plan period does not
support  the  critique  that  the  debt  problem  caused  inflation.28
Instead,  there  were  major  debtor  countries  that  were  able  to
achieve relatively low inflation and (usually) fiscal adjustment
despite  relatively  high  debt  burdens.  Figure  6  shows  that
Colombia, Venezuela,  and Chile, with high outward transfers of
resources  (averaging 4.6 percent of GNP  in 1986-88) managed to
achieve  relatively  moderate  inflation  (averaging 22.9  percent
annually for the same period), while Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
with relatively lower outward transfers of resources (an average
of 2.4 percent of GNP) encountered extremely high inflation (an
average of  245 percent annually for 1986-88).  Indeed, as the
figure shows, the relationship was almost exactly inverse rather
than positive: the highest inflation was in Brazil, which had the
lowest  outward resource  transfer,  with successively  lower inflation
rates for each respective country at successively higher outward
transfer levels.  In short, cross country evidence suggests that
it is possible to control inflation despite the debt burden, if
proper domestic policies are pursued.15
15  A  variant  of  the  inflation argument warrants  further
attention.  In Brazil, the Finance Minister has complained that
the need for the central bank to buy up a large trade surplus has
led  to  excessive  money  expansion.  And  there  has  been  great
criticism of the bank package for Brazil because of  its use of
debt-equity  conversions, under  the  perception  that  these  feed
excessive  money expansion and  thus inflation.  But the central  bank
could reduce money growth  from the trade  surplus by permitting
exporters to sell foreign exchange to firms seeking to buy back
external debt at a discount, instead of requiring that all of it
be turned in to the central bank in exchange for local currency
(and it could afford to do so because the trade surplus in 1988
well exceeded the amount required to service debt).  As for debt-
equity  conversion,  the  amounts  in Brazil  in  1988 that  passed
through formal operations and thus potentially affected the money
supply amounted to less than 3 percent of total money and quasi-
money including  overnight  holdings of government paper, hardly  the29
The Next Phase
Because there has been considerable improvement in the key
debt indicators,  and because countries that have achieved domestic
adjustment and moderate inflation  have been able to sustain growth
despite relatively high debt burdens, there is no reason to change
the central strategic premise of the Baker plan: that the major
debtors can achieve  renewed  growth  while continuing  to manage their
debt  on  a  market-related  basis,  and  that  resort  to  forced
forgiveness of debt or interest is in most cases unnecessary and
would be counterproductive for the future growth of the countries
themselves.  However, there is  a need for a  more intensified  effort
under a Baker-II (or  Brady) Plan for the next few years.
For the banks  (and the capital markets more generally), the
next  phase  in  the  debt  strategy  should  involve a  three-track
approach: multi-year new money programs, voluntary debt reduction,
and  return  to  voluntary  lending  based  on  more  attractive
instruments.  For  the  public  sector,  the  objective  must  be
considerably  higher  actual  net  lending,  at  the  least  full
realization of the increase for the public sector as a whole that
had been  implicit in the original Baker Plan targets.  For the
debtor  countries,  the  objective must  be  actual  achievement  of
adjustment  programs,  centered  on  fiscal  balance  for  domestic
stability and appropriate real exchange rates for export growth.
source of quadruple digit inflation.30
In 1981 and 1982, the net resource transfer to the fifteen
Baker  countries  amounted  to  an  annual  average  inflow  of  $8.9
billion."6  In the first three years after the debt crisis, the
resource transfer averaged an annual  outflow of $38.4 billion.
During the three years of the Baker Plan  (1986-88), the outward
transfer of resources from these countries averaged $28.6 billion
annually.  Despite  the  evidence  that  domestic destabilization
rather  than outward transfer of resources has been  the primary
cause of recent stagnant  growth in some major debtor countries, it
is time for a more determined international  effort  to increase  net
capital flows to the debtor countries.
With  domestic  stabilization  and  forward  growth,  excess
capacity would eventually  be exhausted,  and higher  resource inflows
can contribute to future growth even though stagnation in Latin
America in 1988 was not primarily attributable  to external debt or
outward resource transfers.
Complete elimination of the  outward transfer would  be too
ambitious over the next three to five years, as it would mean a
sufficiently more  rapid buildup  in debt that  progress  in debt
indicators could be halted  prematurely.  However,  a reasonable goal
would be to cut the outward  transfer of resources in  half, to some
$15 billion annually over the next three years.  This objective
16  Estimated as the differenca between the current account
deficit (assumed  equal to  capital inflow,  abstracting from  reserves
change) and net payments of interest  and profits.  Calculated from
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. October 1988
(Washington: IMF, 1988), p. 104.31
would require increasing  net capital flows  from foreign  private  and
official creditors to the debtor  countries by $15 billion annually
over the average achieved under the Baker Plan.
MULTI-YEAR NEW MONEY  --  Debtor country governments would have
much more certainty in  planning if  banks would agree to new lending
programs over three year or even five year periods. 17 Ideally the
levels programmed for new bank money would decline over time (for
example, from a benchmark in the first  year equivalent to say half
of interest due to perhaps 30 percent by the third and 10 percent
by  the  fifth), with  the  objective  of  a  progressive  shift  to
voluntary private capital and to official lending sources.  To the
extent  possible, countries  should  make new  money options attractive
to banks  (debt-equity conversion rights, relending rights, new
money bonds)  to facilitate mobilization  (as in the Brazil  1988
program).  Moreover, those banks (primarily in Europe) preferring
for tax or regulatory reasons to participate by capitalizing some
interest  due  rather  than  making  new  loans  could  useBfully  be
permitted to do so, although such banks would have no basis for
insisting that all other banks also capitalize (and that outcome
would  be  adverse  because  it  could  initiate  a  transition  to
unilateral insistence by the country that specified fractions of
17  Thus, President Carlos Salinas of Mexico stated as one of
his  four principles on debt that the country should be assured
multi-year access to new loans.  His three other principles were:
reduction of the outward resource  transfer, reduction of the stock
of debt to closer to its secondary market value, and reduction of
the debt/GNP ratio during his regime.  Wall Street Journal, Dec.
2, 1988.32
interest be capitalized each year).
VOLUNTARY DEBT REDUCTION  --  By the end of the initial  three-year
horizon of the Baker Plan, perhaps the major change from what its
authors anticipated was the low value of the debt in secondary
markets, on the one hand, and the related activity in debt-equity
conversions  and  discounted  debt  repurchases,  on  the  other.
Secondary market  prices for  Argentine debt  were in  the range of 20-
25 cents on the dollar; for Brazil, 40 cents; Mexico, 44 cents;
Chile, 58 cents; and Venezuela, 42 cents. 18
Low  secondary  market  prices  offer  the opportunity  for  mutually
beneficial  voluntary  debt  reduction  operations  between  the
countries and those banks desiring to exit.  The banks are not
monolithic,  and  many  of  the  smaller  banks  in  particular  are
prepared to accept 50 cents on the dollar or less if  the asset they
receive is secure, even as other banks  (particularly those with
long  experience  and,  in  many  cases,  local  branches,  in  the
countries)  anticipate  eventual  recovery  of  the  countries'  economies
and consider the true value of their claims much closer to face
value than indicated by the secondary market.  Yet the banks with
the more favorable long-term expectations typically are not in a
position to buy up the debt from the banks seeking immediate exit
because they must be careful of their own exposure limits in the
countries.
Much debt reduction has already occurred.  Mexico has reduced
is  Salomon  Brothers,  International  Loaa  Trading, Dec.  22, 1988.33
its private sector debt from $22.5 billion in 1983 to $10 billion
at the end of 1988, largely through debt-equity conversions and
repurchases  of  outstanding  debt  on  a  discounted  basis.  The
Institute for International Finance estimates that $26 billion in
external debt of the Baker-15 countries has been extinguished by
voluntary  debt  reduction,  with  $17  billion  occurring  in  1988
alone. 19 The organization  estimated  that approximately  three-fifths
of this  amount had  occurred in debt-equity and  local currency
conversions, one-third  in private  sector  restructuring with  a
relief component, and a small portion in debt buybacks and debt
exchange into "exit bonds." 20
Countries  with  adequate  reserves  can  make  discounted
repurchases of debt, as Chile did in late 1988 with its windfall
gains from  higher copper  prices. Other countries  can conduct  debt-
equity conversion programs, although the experience of Mexico and
by  early  1989  Brazil  suggests  that  sensitivity  to  monetary
expansion under these programs can limit their dimensions.
The most promising instrument for debt reduction would be an
"enhanced exit bond."  The concept of this instrument is that it
converts the bank's existing claim into another asset which has a
value closer to the secondary market price.  The benefit for the
country is alleviation of its debt.  The benefit for the bank is
19  Institute for International Finance, The Way Forward for
Middle-Income Countries (Washington:  IIF, January 1989), p. 22.
20  However, much  of the  "local currency  conversion" also
amounts  to debt buybacks, as recipients  then use the local  currency
to purchase dollars on the parallel exchange market.34
greater security  of the asset,  combined  with the understanding  that
the bank will no longer  be expected to provide additional lending
as part of any future concerted new lending packages.
The  small magnitudes of both the early  1988 Mexico-Morgan
Guaranty exit bond (which  converted some $3 billion into long-term
bonds with principal but not interest guaranteed by US Treasury
zero-coupon  bonds, and sold at a price of 70 cents on the dollar)
and the 1988 Brazil exit bond  (which converted about $1 billion
into  bonds paying 6  percent over 25 years) indicates that the real
problem with these instruments  so far has been their lack of blue-
chip security.  In particular, creditors continue to doubt that
even  the  reduced  instruments  will  be  fully  honored  by  the
government.  Thus, the Mexico-Morgan bond sold at a price that
attributed full  confidence  only  to  the zero-coupon-backed  principal
but  continued  to  discount  unguaranteed  interest at  the  going
secondary market rate for Mexican obligations.
One  of  the  most  important potential  changes  in the  debt
strategy over the medium term would be joint action by the banks
and the public sector in industrial  countries to provide effective
guarantees  to  exit  bonds.  If  these  instruments  were  fully
reliable, it is  conceivable  that  banks representing  some 30  percent
to 40 percent of the claims on debtor countries would be willing
to accept them at a value of 50 cents or less on the dollar to make
a clean exit from the debt problem.
So  far  the  public  sector  has  been  unwilling  to  issue
guarantees to back exit bonds.  The political concern  has been that35
to do so would appear to be "bailing out the banks."  It is time
to discard this false argument.  Any bank that accepted an exit
bond worth say 50 cents or less on the dollar would by definition
already be absorbing massive losses up  front.  It would  not be
meaningful  to  say  that  the  public  sector  by  guaranteeing the
instrument would be making good the losses that the bank should
otherwise absorb.
Two measures would make exit bonds gilt-edged.  First, the
banks themselves should agree that exit bonds have seniority over
the other claims of banks.  Here the idea would be that even those
banks choosing to retain their full claims would benefit from the
reduced  burden on the country  accorded  by the banks chosing  to exit
at a cost.  For this purpose, serious  consideration  should  be given
to new  legislation that permits  a  two-thirds majority  of bank
creditors of a sovereign nation (by value of claims outstanding)
to grant senior  status over their own existing claims, to specific
new instruments  to be issued1  by the country.  The legislation  would
provide for carefully controlled conditions, such as the presence
of a program approved by the US Treasury and the International
Monetary Fund.  Moreover, the banking community as a whole would
presumably authorize such instruments  only up to specified amounts
and over specified periods.  The point, however, is that once it
became unambiguous that exit bonds stood at the head of the que,
the instruments would have a high degree of reliability.
Because the bulk of Latin American debt is under contracts
that  specify New  York as the jurisdictional area,  it might  be36
sufficient for  US law  alone to  make this change,  although a similar
law in the United Kingdom would cover the jurisdiction of most of
tie rest of the debt.  While initially  such laws could not be iron-
clad  assurdnce  against constitutional challenge by a  dissident
bank, and while issues of extra-territoriality could arise, the
fact  that  the  class  whose  interests  could  be  injured by  the
granting  of  such  senior  status,  namely  the  banking  community
itself, would by the law be directly represented in the decision
(and  on a two-thirds majority basis) would throw into question the
standing of such a plaintiff.  In this regard, the conferal of
seniority by a high majority of banks would differ sharply from
attempts  to  legislate mandatory  debt  forgiveness, because  the
affected parties would  (in their majority) approve in the first
case and disapprove in the second. 21 Moreover, there is precedent
in  domestic bankruptcy law for  joint action  by a class of creditors
that supersedes claims of dissident individual members.
The second step to make exit bonds secure instruments would
be, in addition to conferral of seniority  by the banks themselves,
the issuance of guarantees by the World Bank (and Inter-American
Development Bank).22  Because the senior status accorded by the
21  Thus, the Institute of International  Finance has recently
warned  that  mandatory  cancellation  of  debt  would  be
"unconstitutional taking of property" and "would be contested in
the courts."  Institute  of International  Finance, The Way Forward,
p. 20.
22  See John Williamson, Voluntary Approaches to Debt Relief
(Washington:  Institute  for  International  rconomics,  Policy  Analyses
in International Economics No. 25, September 1988).37
banks would  already make the instruments relatively secure, it
would be appropriate if necessary to count only a fraction (such
as 20 percent) of the value of the exit bonds against the capital
of  the  institutions, rather  than  require  one-for-one  zapital
backing as is the usual case for lending by these institutions.
The  structure of the  exit bonds would  usually need to be
relatively long-term  (such as 20 to 25 years).  Otherwise, the
payments  on the  instruments would  be  as high  as  the  interest
payments  on  existing  bank  claims. 23 Yet  for  most  countries
voluntary debt reduction needs to make a contribution  to near-term
cash flow as well as long-term  balance sheet improvement.
In  September  of  1988  Japanese  authorities  proposed  the
establishment of a window at the IMF that would take deposits of
reserves from debtor countries for use in providing collateral for
exit  bonds,  and  the Japanese  apparently  had  in mind  parallel
lending from industrial countries to the debtor  countries that
would  provide  the  reserves  required  for  this  purpose.  This
proposal  was moving in  the direction of  official support  to enhance
exit  bonds.  While industrial  country officials have disavowed the
use of World Bank guarantees for this purpose, a reconsideration
of this position is in order, especially under the condition that
the banking community would be prepared to minimize the potential
a  For example, 7-year  bonds bearing 9 percent interest  would
involve cash outflow  equal to 23  percent of face  value in  the first
year.  Even if the face value were set at one-half the original
loan, the  resulting payments would  stand at  11-1/2 percent of
original loan  value, higher than interest  payments on the original
claims (with  all principal rolled over).38
risk to the World Bank by granting seniority to the instruments.
The World Bank and other official lenders could in principle
also  contribute  to voluntary  debt  reduction by making  policy-
related (non-project)  lending  available for  the purpose of country
repurchases  of debt  from the  secondary market  at  a  discount.
However, any such lending would have to be truly additional to
official flows that would otherwise  occur.  If lending  for buybacks
were not additional, the net effect for the country would usually
be a negative cash-flow impact for the first five years or so. 24
A major push for voluntary debt reduction (VDR)  by the banks
and  the  international  financia.  institutions  would  have  the
potential to reduce the debt owed to banks by perhaps 15 to 20
percent (that  is, a reduction  by half in  the value of the debt held
by banks accounting for 30 to 40 percent of bank debt).  This
reduction would be important economically and perhaps even more
important  politically,  as  it  would  enable  leaders  in  debtor
countries to point to an important supportive shift by creditors.
If the debt  problem were  as intractable as many  believe, this
24  Thus, suppose that in case A  the country would receive
fast-disbursing policy  lending which  it would  use  for general
purposes, while in case B it  would dedicate the same funds to debt
buybacks.  In case A there would be one dollar of freely avai.able
foreign  exchange for each dollar of World Bank policy lending.  In
case  B,  the  country would  spend  the dollar  to  repurchase two
dollars' worth of debt owed to the banns.  The interest  on the two
dollars debt would be some 20 certs for the current  year.  The net
effect on cash flow for the c-untry would thus be one dollar in
case A but only 20 cents in case B.  Indeed, unless the secondary
market price  falls to as low as the interest rate  (that is, 10
cents on the dolla'  ),  buybacks have negative  cash flow in  the first
year.39
amount of debt reduction would not be enough; more thorough-going
relief of a bankruptcy nature would be required.  But as analyzed
above, at least for the major debtors the progress on debt to date
is compatible with the moderate alleviation that voluntary debt
reduction offers rather than requiring more radical measures.
One important side effect of more energetic voluntary debt
reduction would be an increase  in the secondary  market price.  The
secondary  market is  extremely thin. and VDR would boost the demand
substantially.  Sometimes  officials  and  analysts  in  debtor
countries express  concern  that  debt-equity  conversion and  other  VDR
measures would  raise the secondary market price; their implicit
fear is that somehow the country would lose the opportunity to
cancel the debt at low prices such as 30 to 50 cents on the dollar
if the secondary market price rebounded to the 60-80 cent level.
The flaw with this reaction is that in the absence of conversion
the  debt  continues  to  accrue  interest at  the  full  face  rate
regardless of its low secondary market price, so that the seeming
lost  opportunity is in fact not  a loss at all.  Instead, the proper
way to view the rising secondary  market  price likely  to follow  VDR
is  as a sign of restored  health  and return  toward creditworthiness.
Until the secondary market price returns far closer to the 80 cent
- 100  cent  range,  it will  be  difficult  to  reestablish  truly
voluntary capital flows.
NEW VOLUNTARY LENDING MECHANISMS  --  The third track for capital
flows in the near term should be a range of instruments designed
to revive voluntary lending even as the secondary market price40
rises.  Direct investment is a crucial component of these flows.
Control of high  domestic  inflation and a  return of  domestic
economies toward more normal conditions would help spur renewed
interest of foreign investors,  but in addition the liberalization
of restrictions (in  such countries as Mexico) could help.
For  existing  bank creditors, it  would make sense to supplement
new  money  packages  that  involve  all  creditors  (except those
choosing exit  bonds) with  club  loans involving a  more  limited
number of large players.  These loans would ideally have elements
to make them attractive in their own right so that they would not
have to be coerced.  One example would be the issuance of bonds
convertible  into commodities as the  instrument for club deals.
Banks could thus anticipate some chance of profit, while actual
convertibility  (for example, into oil at $20 per barrel  if the
current price is $15) would provide an inherent in-kind guarantee
(in  this example, equivalent to 75 cents on the dollar, well above
the  secondary  market  price  for  standard  obligations  of  the
country).  It would be desirable to bring new actors into the club
operations, such as insurance  companies.
PUBLIC  SECTOR LENDING  --  Beyond  these approaches for  bank lending,
it will be necessary in the next phase of the international debt
strategy to make good on the promise of increased  official support
implicit in the original Baker Plan.  As Indicated  above, with the
period 1983-85 considered as a base, net capital flows from the
consolidated public sector (IMF, multilateral development banks,
and  bilateral  export  credit  agencies)  fell  from  $9.3  billion41
annually to only $5.2 billion annually in the Baker Plan period
(1986-88).  The public sector could well seek a goal of increased
net disbursements to the large debtors in an amount of some $10
billion annually, of which half would be merely returning to the
levels of 1983-85.  Private capital flows could then pick up the
other $5 billion of the $15 billion increase in net flows to the
highly  indebted  countries  identified  above  as  the  increment
required to cut their outward transfer of resources by half.
CAPITAL  FLOW OBJECTIVES  --  Table  4  shows  an  illustrative  set  of
capital  flow  objectives  for  the  period  1989-91  for  the  highly
indebted  (Baker  Plan)  countries.  Net  disbursements  by multilateral
development  banks  could  double  to  approximately  $8  billion
annually; export  credit  and  other  bilateral agencies  could increase
net flows to $4  billion annually (with  perhaps an especially large
rise by the Japanese).  The private banks would double the new-
money  equivalent  of  their  lending and  debt-reduction efforts,
returning their net flows to slightly below the 1983-85 average.
Some  further expansion in direct investment would be  expected,
bringing  the  total  increase to  the  $15  billion needed  to  cut
outward resfiurce  transfers  by  half.  These objectives are feasible,
although  they  would  require  an  intensified  commitment  to  the
multilateral agencies (but  not necessarily immediate increases in
capital, except for the Inter-American Bank) as well as increased
dynamism in new money arrangements,  voluntary debt reduction, and
club loans as well as other voluntary finance from the banks.
Above all, however, it will be the pursuit of sound economic42
policies in the debtor countries themselves that will determine
the feasibility of such a program.  With poor policies, official
donors  will  be  unprepared to  move  ahead,  and  banks  may  allow
arrears to build and set aside more reserves rather than provide
additional new  money or  voluntary  debt relief. With sound policies
in  debtor  countries,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that
financing in the ranges shown in the table could be mobilized, and
more broadly that most of the debtor countries will be able to
achieve  politically  acceptable  economic  growth  and  moderate
inflation  while continuing to make progress in restoring external
creditworthiness.43
Table  1
Total  External  Debt,  1982 and  1987
($ billions  and percentages)
1982  1987  Percent  Chanae
All  Developing  Countries  781.2  1,167.1  49.0
Highly  Indebted  391.2  527.3  34.8
Other  392.1  639.9  63.2
of which:
Algeria  16.7  22.9  37.1
China  8.4  30.2  259.5
Egypt  26.2  40.3  53.8
Greece  11.2  23.1  106.3
Hungary  9.0  19.0  111.1
India  25.6  46.4  81.2
Indonesia  26.5  52.6  98.5
Malaysia  11.3  21.7  92.0
Pakistan  11.6  16.3  40.5
Poland  (a)  31.0  42.1  35.8
Portugal  13.6  18.2  33.8
Thailand  12.2  20.7  69.7
Turkey  19.7  40.8  107.1
Subtotal  223.0  394.3  76.8
Latin  America
World  Bank  332.8  442.0  32.8
ECLA  331.0  410.5  24.0
Latin  America-6  major
World  Bank  281.2  363.3  29.2
ECLA  285.1  331.3  16.2
a.  Initial  year  is 1985.
Source:  Calculated  from World  Bank,  World  Debt Tables  1988,  Vol.
II;  ECLA,  Balance  Preliminar  de la Economia  Latinoamericana,  1987
and  1988.44
Table  2
Capital  Flowa  Under  the Baker  Plan:  1986-88
($  millions)
Banks(a)  Public  Sector  Total
Multilateral  Bilateral  IMF,  Total
Argentina  2,607  1,680  716  844  3,240  5,847
Bolivia  0  555  230  111  896  896-
Brazil  4,000  1,556  -385  -2,032  -861  3,139
Chile  215  1,132  87  -3  1,216  1,431
Colombia  1,957  952  286  0  1,238  2,195
Costa  Rica  0  134  -17  -146  -29  -29
Cote  d'Ivoire  0  502  357  -226  633  633
Ecuador  0  858  264  -39  1,083  1,083
Jamaica  0  154  110  -327  -63  -63
Mexico  5,472  2,190  2,301  1,166  5,657  11,129
Morocco  0  949  553  -495  1,007  1,007
Nigeria  0  1,009  704  0  1,713  1,713
Peru  0  314  180  -52  442  442
Philippines  525  355  928  -185  1,098  1,623
Uruguay  0  174  -9  -113  52  52
Venezuela  0  145  -215  0  -70  -70
Yugoslavia  0  -59  -280  -1,171  -1,510  -1,510
Total  13,776  12,601  5,809  -2667  15,742  29,518
a.  Disbursements  under  new money  packages.
Source:  World  Bank, World  Debt Tables  1988, Vol.  I, p. ixliii;  Vol. II; IMF,
International  Financial  Statistics,  January  1989;  and  World  Bank,  by
communication.  Estimates  include  bank  lending  of  $4  billion  to  Brazil
completed  in late  1988.45
Table 3
Capital Flows to Highly Indebted Countries, 1951-88
($  millions)
Public'Sector  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  '1987  1988
Multilateral 2,719  3,881  3,069  4,522  3,997  5,150  3,370  4,082
Bilateral  3,158  1,719  2,539  1,525  697  1,158  1,919  2,738
IMF  1,213  2,110  6,517  3,334  1,686  -206  -1,384  -1,077
Total  7,000  7,710 12,125  9,381  6,380  6,102  3,905  5,743
Banks (a)  20,205  23,263 13,575  10,427  5,345  3,455  4,931  5,450
Total  27,205  30,973 25,700  19,808  11,725  9,557  8,836  11,193
Source:  World Bank, World Debt Tables 1988,  Vol. I, pp. xliii, 30-31 and by
communication; table 2.
a.  For 1981-82:  net disbursements from "financial markets".  For 1983-88:
disbursements under new money packages.46
Table  4
Annual  Average  Capital  Flows  to Highly
Indebted  Countries  by Period,  1983-91
($  billions)
1983-85  1986-88  1989-91
Public
Multilateral  Banks  3.9  4.2  8
Bilateral  1.6  1.9  4
IMF  3.8  -0.9  2
Total  9.3  5.2  14
Private
Banks  9.8  4.6  9
Direct  Investment  14.5  8.1  10
Total  33.6  17.9  33
Source:  Table  3; IMF, World  Economic  Outlook  October  1988, p.  115
(for "non-debt-creating"  flows)..
120-
110 
oil
100  ' 
70  -
50  -
50
40 
10
0-  I  - _  I  I  I
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88
Figure  1
Commodity  Price  Indexes  for  Latin  American  Exports
(1980=100);  ;  /  /  Venezuela  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~krenin
50 
40  -
30Coobac
S.9
10~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
20
so  S1  82  83  84  85  86  87  88
Figure  2
Ratio of Interest  Paid (Accrual  Basis)
to Exports  of Goods and Services
(percentages)400
350
300
250
200
150
100 
50  - 50
S1  82  83  84  85  a5  87  as
Figure  3
Latin  America:  Total  and  Relative  Debt
0  Nominal  External  Debt ($  billion)
+ Real  External  Debt ($  billion,  1982  prices)
* Debt/  Exports  of  Goods  and  Services  (percent)6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
CaL
COL
5  0vsN
4 - BRZ
n
ARG
o  0
2  o2
MEX
T~~~~
-1  - I  I  II 
1.5  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5
Outward Transfer  (% GNP)
Figure  4  Outward  Resource  Transfers  and  Economic  Growth,  1986-08  Averages
Six  Latin  American  Countries6  _  @L
COL
VEN
4  BRZ
_ARG
s.n
'-'I  2
O  10- 3:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:
-1  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  ,x  I  I  ,  I 
10  30  50  70  90  110  130  150  170  190  210
Inflation  (Avg.  '85'87,  St)
Figure  5  Average  Inflation  and Average  Growth  One Year Later,  1985-87
Six Latin  American  Countries4ZO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
450  -
BRZ
<0  ~0 400-
3 5
300-
;250  -
i  O  ARG
200 
150
MEX
100
50  ~  COL  VEN
°  0  CHLg
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1.5  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5
Outward Transfer  (X  GNP)
Figure  6  Outward  Resource  Transfers  and  Inflation,  1986-88  Averages
Six Latin  American  CountriesPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
iwa  Author  for paer
WPS240 The Public  Role  in Private
Post-SecondaryEducation:
A Review  of Issues  and Options  Ake Blomqvist
Emmanuel  Jimenez  August  1989  A. Bhalla
61059
WPS241 The Effect  of Job Training  on  Ana-Maria  Arriagada  July 1989  C. Cristobal
Peruvian  Women's  Employment  and  33640
Wages
WPS242 A Multi-Level  Model  of School  Effectiveness
in a Developing  Country  Marlaine  Lockheed
Nicholas  Longford
WPS243  Averting  Financial  Crisis - Kuwait  Fawzi  Hamad  Al-Sultan
WPS244 Do Caribbean  Exporters  Pay  Higher
Freight Costs?  Alexander  Yeats  July 1989  J. Epps
33710
WPS245 Developing  a Partnership  of Indigenous
Peopoes,  Conservationists,  and Land  Use
Planners  in Latin  America  Peter Poole  August  1989  S. Davis
38622
WPS246 Causes  of Adult Deaths  in Developing
Countries:  A Review  of Data  and  Richard  Hayes  July 1989  S. Ainsworth
Methods  Thierry Mertens  31091
Geraldine  Lockett
Laura  Rodrigues
WPS247 Mairroaconomic  Policies  for Structural
Adjustment  Carlos  A. Rodriguez
WPS248 Private Investment,  Govemment  Policy  and
Foreign  Capital  in Zimbabwe  Mansoor  Dailami  August  1989  M. Raggambi
Michael  Walton  61696
WPS249 The Determinants  of Hospital  Costs:
An Analysis  of Ethiopia  Ricardo  Bitran-Dicowsky
David  W. Dunlop
WPS250 The Baker  Plan: Progress,  William  R. Cline  August  1989  S. King-Watson
Shortcomings,  and Future  Evolution  33730
WPS251  Patents,  Appropriate  Technology,  Ishac  Diwan
and North-South  Trrade  Dani  Rodrik
WPS252  Do the Secondary  Markets  Believe  Vassilis  A. Hajivassiliou  August 1989  S. King-Watson
in  Life After Debt  33730PPR  'Aorking  Paper  Series
Contact
Iiwa  Atnhor  for paper
WPS228  Economic  Performance  of  Robert  Lynn
Developing  Countries  in the 1980s  F. Desmond  McCarthy
WPS229 The Effect  of Demographic  Changes  on Saving
for Life-Cycle  Motives  in Developing
Countries  Steven  B. Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi  Zia  61765
WPS230  Unemployment,  Migratior.  and Wages
in Turkey,  1962-1985  Bent  Hansen  July 1989  C. Bermudez
39248
WPS231  The  World  Bank  Revised  Minimum
Standard  Model  Doug Addison  May 1989  J. Onwuemene-
Kocha
61750
WPS232  Women  and Food  Security  in Kenya Nadine  R. Horenstein  June 1989  M. Villar
33752
WPS233  Public  Enterprise  Reform  in Adjustment
Lending  John  Nellis  August  1989  R. Malcolm
61708
WPS234  A Consistency  Framework
Macroeconomic Analysis  William  Easterly  June 1989  R. Luz
61760
WPS235  Borrowing,  Resource  Transfers
and Extemal  Shocks  to Developing
Countries: Historical  and
Counterfactual  Steven Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi  Zia  61765
WPS236 Education  and Earnings  in Peru's
Informal  Nonfarm  Family  Enterprises Peter Moock  Ju!y 1989  M. Fisher
Philip Musgrove  34819
Morton Stelcner
WPS237  The  Curricular  Content  of Primary
Education  in Develcping  Countries  Aaron  Benavot  June 1989  C. Cristobal
David  Kamens  33640
WPS238  The Distributional  Consequences  of a
Tax Reform  on a VAT  for Pakistan  Ehtisham  Ahmad
Stephen  Ludlow
WPS239  The  Choice  Between  Unilateral  and Multi-
lateral  Trade  Liberalization  Strategies  Julio Nogues  July 1989  S. Torrijos
33709